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PROTECTING AGAINST THE HARMS OF
THE MISTAKEN UTILITY
UNDERCHARGE
ROGER D. COLTON*
When low-income households pay too little for their utility bills, it
sometimes poses a serious threat to the continuation of their service.
The threat arises when, after months or years of undercharges, the util-
ity discovers a mistake and bills the household for the outstanding bal-
ance. Typically, the utility's own billing errors create the mistake.'
Because they lack the resources to pay a cumulative sum, low-income
households need a legal mechanism with which to protect themselves.
The application of two legal doctrines initially appears to protect a
customer from liability to pay for past undercharges. First, the basic
contract doctrine of "mistake" provides that in such situations the bur-
den of the error should lie with the party who is most capable of both
preventing the error and bearing the risk of the mistake.2 Second, if
there has been a change in position by an innocent party in reliance on
the mistake, then the other party may be estopped to raise the
* B.A., 1975, Iowa State University; J.D., 1981, University of Florida. Roger D.
Colton is an attorney with the National Consumer Law Center in Boston,
Massachusetts.
Legal Services Corporation funds were not used in the preparation of this article.
1. In one Oregon case, for example, the utility apparently connected the meters to
the wrong apartments in a duplex, with Mrs. A's meter reading Mrs. B's apartment and
vice versa. Toon v. Pacific Power & Light Co., Docket UC-139, No. 90-236 (Feb. 20,
1990).
2. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAS §§ 613-19 (1952).
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mistake.3
Unfortunately, in the regulated utility context, the law is not quite so
simple. Public utilities assume a statutory4 and common law' duty to
provide service at rates that are not discriminatory. This duty prohib-
its a utility from providing service at a rate less than the one published
in its tariffs.6 Because of this obligation, in cases arising from a mistake
on the part of a utility, the utility has not only the right, but the duty,
to collect the undercharge.7 In these instances, the mandatory duties
of the public utility to adhere to its tariffs and to prevent the grant of
rebates or other preferences outweigh the doctrines of mistake and
estoppel.8
This article scrutinizes the utility undercharge.9 First, Part I in-
troduces the basic law concerning estoppel. Then, Part II discusses the
application of estoppel doctrine to the collection of undercharges by
public utilities. Next, Part III examines whether, even in situations
where the utility may collect the undercharge, it may be prohibited
from using service disconnection as a collection device. Part IV ana-
3. A. CORBIN, supra note 2, § 606.
4. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-2-103 (Bums 1988) (pronouncing statutory duty
to avoid discriminatory rate-making); but see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110 (1988) (stating
that the commission will determine whether tariffs will be uniform).
5. See, e.g., State ex rel. Guste v. Council of New Orleans, 309 So. 2d 290, 294 (La.
1975) (noting that in the absence of a statutory command, courts adopt the generally
prevailing rule that a utility's rate structure must be non-discriminatory).
6. See generally 13 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CoNTAcrs 585, n.1 (W. Jaeger
3d ed. 1970).
7. See, e.g., Goddard v. Public Service Co. of Colo., 43 Colo. App. 77, 599 P.2d 278
(1979) (requiring the utility to collect the balance due despite the fault of the utility in
underbilling for gas); Corporation de Gestion Ste-Foy, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light
Co., 385 So. 2d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (requiring public utility to collect un-
dercharges from established rates); Haverhill Gas Co. v. Findlen, 357 Mass. 417, 258
N.E.2d 294 (1970) (requiring gas company to charge rates established by law); Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tel. Co. ofVa. v. Bles, 218 Va. 1010, 243 S.E.2d 473 (1978) (conclud-
ing that interstate rail carriers must collect underbillings, regardless of error or mistake
in billing).
8. The equitable policy of estoppel may not outweigh these statutory directives. The
application of these principles in the freight industry have often been discussed. Anno-
tation, Carriers Understatement of Charges Where Discrimination is Forbidden, 88
A.L.R. 2d 1375 (1963); Annotation, Carrier's Right or Liability in Respect of Excess of
Lawful Charge Over Charge Understated Where Discrimination is Forbidden, 88 A.L.R.
2d 245 (1933). The courts rely on freight cases in deciding public utility cases. See
infra note 20 and accompanying text.
9. This article does not specifically consider the situation in which the underbilling
may be due to a "slow" meter.
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lyzes the right of a consumer to bring a counter-claim for damages
resulting from a utility's mistaken undercharge. Finally, Part V rec-
ommends the adoption of a new approach to the problem of the utility
undercharge as it relates to low-income households.
This article holds that courts will find that a utility has not only a
right, but an obligation, to collect mistaken undercharges and that the
doctrine of estoppel will not abrogate that obligation. The article fur-
ther concludes that while a utility has the right and obligation to col-
lect mistaken undercharges, it may indeed be estopped from using the
disconnection of service as a collection device. The article finally urges
the adoption of a new three-pronged approach to the collection of util-
ity undercharges: (1) the inclusion of both service and non-discrimina-
tion factors in the undercharge analysis; (2) the grant of rebates for a
failure to provide timely bills; and (3) the award of damages for any
failure to provide timely and accurate bills.
I. THE DoCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL
Equitable estoppel, otherwise known as estoppel in pais, is the doc-
trine to which low-income advocates might turn in the utility un-
dercharge context. The general rule of equitable estoppel is simple:
"[hie who, by his language l° or conduct,11 induces another to do what
he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss
or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted."12
Estoppel does not turn on any misconduct. There need be no intent to
10. See Dickson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 77 Wash. 2d 785, 788, 466
P.2d 515, 517 (1970) (concluding that an insurance company's statement that a claim
selection was not final estopped them from asserting a statute of limitations defense
because plaintiff relied on that statement in its delayed filing of action).
11. See Sharp v. Interstate Master Freight Sys., 442 S.W. 2d 939, 946 (Mo. 1969)
(noting that prior conduct may estop a party from claiming rights or benefits).
12. I. X. L. Stores Co. v. Success Mkts., 98 Utah 160, 166, 97 P.2d 577, 580 (1939).
In the landmark case of Chesapeake & Oh. Ry. Co. v. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 40 S.E. 633
(1902), the Virginia Supreme Court stated:
[Wlhen one person, by his statements, conduct, action, behavior, concealment or
even silence, has induced another, who has a right to rely on those statements, etc.
and who does rely upon them in good faith, to believe in the existence of a state of
facts with which they are compatible, and act upon that belief, the former will not
be allowed to assert, as against the latter, the existence of a different state of facts
from that indicated by his statements or conduct, if the latter has so far changed
his position that he would be injured thereby.
Id. at 91, 40 S.E. at 641.
1991]
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deceive,"3 nor any negligence in the statement of erroneous facts. 14
Thus, equitable estoppel initially seems to be particularly applicable in
the instance of mistaken undercharges for utility service to low-income
households.
Invocation of estoppel could prevent injury to households that struc-
ture their budgets upon the belief that their utility bills are a complete
and accurate reflection of the charges owed. Indeed, a low-income
household must rely on the accuracy of a utility's bills. The household
struggles to allocate its scarce resources each month. It rarely has suf-
ficient funds to set aside for possible future liabilities.' 5 These house-
holds make month-to-month decisions on how to apportion limited
income among substantial expenses.
Notably, however, an estoppel defense can fail in several places, even
apart from the unique problems with utility undercharges as discussed
below. First, the action of the party asserting the defense, the plaintiff,
must be causally connected to the statement of the person against
whom estoppel is asserted, the defendant. Thus, the defendant's state-
ment must have "induced" the action. 16 If the action would have oc-
curred in any event, then no estoppel will attach.
13. However, there must be an intent that the statement be acted upon, American
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. BIM, Inc., 885 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1989); an expectation that
it will be relied and acted upon, Shane v. WCAU-TV, CBS Television Stations, Division
of CBS, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1989); or a foreseeability that it will be relied
and acted upon. Wolf Bros. Oil Co. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 718 F.
Supp. 839 (W.D. Wash. 1989).
14. The elements of equitable estoppel differ from state to state. See, eg., In re
Yachthaven Restaurant, Inc., 103 Bankr. 68, 77 (Bktcy. E.D.N.Y. 1989) (articulating
five elements of equitable estoppel); Careau Group v. United Farm Workers of
America, 716 F. Supp. 1319 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (articulating four elements of equitable
estoppel); Reifschneider v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 233 Neb. 695, 447 N.W.2d 622
(1989) (articulating six elements of equitable estoppel); Marashi v. Lannen, 55 Wash.
App. 82, 780 P.2d 1341 (1989) (articulating three elements of equitable estoppel).
15. See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, ENERGY AND THE POOR: THE FOR-
GOTTEN CRISIS (May 1989); NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, LOSING THE
FIGHT IN UTAH: LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS AND RISING ENERGY COSTS 46-48 (Jan.
1989); NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE CRISIS CONTINUES: ADDRESSING
THE ENERGY PLIGHT OF LOW-INCOME PENNSYLVANIANS THROUGH PERCENTAGE OF
INCOME PLANS, at 1-4 to I-5 (Nov. 1986).
16. Chesapeake & Oh. Ry. v. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 91, 40 S.E. 633, 641 (1902). In .
X. L. Stores, the concurring opinion argued that the person against whom estoppel is
urged must have intended the inducement to occur. I. X. L. Stores, 98 Utah at 168, 97
P.2d at 581 (Wolfe, J., concurring). As a general rule, however, there must only be a
reasonable expectation that the person urging estoppel would rely upon the statement.
31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 69 (1964).
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Second, the plaintiff must not only have relied on the defendant's
statements, but must have maintained a right to rely on them. If the
plaintiff actually knew, or could have discovered the true state of facts
by any reasonable effort,17 then she cannot raise an estoppel defense.
Finally, the plaintiff must be injured as a result of the reliance. If no
injury occurs,"5 or if the injury is only "speculative," 19 an estoppel de-
fense will not be available.
Notwithstanding this general estoppel doctrine, basic utility law pre-
vents the use of an estoppel defense to avoid the payment of utility
undercharges.
II. THE CURRENT UTILITY RULE
The general utility rule provides that in instances of a mistaken un-
derbilling by a public utility,20 the erring company holds not only the
right, but the obligation, to collect the underpayment.21 Neither the
reason for the underbilling nor the impact on the customer will miti-
gate the effect on the operation of this rule. In refusing to rely on mis-
take and estoppel in the underbilling context, most courts reason that
invoking equitable estoppel against a public utility would violate the
strong public policy against discriminatory rates.22 The application of
the general rule is well-illustrated in the Pennsylvania decision of West
17. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
20. While this paper addresses the problem of the public utility undercharge, courts
often rely upon railroad and freight cases involving undercharges for authority. See,
eg., Goddard v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 43 Colo. App. 77, 78, 599 P.2d 278, 279
(1979) (finding case dealing with misquotation of freight rates persuasive in deciding
utility undercharge case); Corporation de Gestion Ste-Foy, Inc. v. Florida Power &
Light Co., 385 So. 2d 124, 126 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980) (relying on rail rate case to con-
clude that power utility must collect underbilling balance); Haverhill Gas Co. v. Fin-
dlen, 258 N.E.2d 294, 296 (Mass. 1970) (holding that rail carriers and other utilities are
equated by statute and must charge rates set by law); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.
of Va. v. Bles, 218 Va. 1010, 1013, 243 S.E. 2d 473, 476 (1978) (holding that rail carriers
and utilities must adhere to rates imposed by state).
21. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
22. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. Inc. v. Jet Asphalt Corp., 132 A.D.2d 296,
522 N.Y.S.2d 124 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). "[fIt is apparent that to permit an un-
dercharge, whether intentionally or inadvertently made, is to grant a preferential rebate
to a customer in violation of the statutory mandate." Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.
of Va. v. Bles, 218 Va. 1010, 1014, 243 S.E. 2d 473, 476 (1978). To permit an un-
dercharge, the courts hold, would be to disrupt the uniform application of rates. Shoe-
maker v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 38 Colo. App. 321, 324, 559 P.2d 721, 723-24
1991]
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Penn Power Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.23 in which the
court summarily rejected proffered defenses to an underbiHing. In
West Penn Power, the utility undercharged the customer for thirty-one
months.24 The customer paid the bills as presented but refused to pay
a bill for the undercharge. The trial court found that the only issue
raised by the pleadings related to the quantity of electricity supplied to
defendant during the underbilling period.25 Noting that the law estab-
lished the tariff or rate and that the plaintiff admitted to the amount
paid by the defendant during the thirty-one month period, the court
stated that the defendant's denial of additional service above that origi-
nally billed by plaintiff created the dispute.26 The appellate court
agreed, stating the only issue was whether Nationwide paid in full for
the electricity provided by the utility.27 If the meter showed that the
defendant consumed the amount of electricity alleged by the utility, the
court held, "then the latter's right [to collect] is unquestionable."28
Courts will not consider a utility's responsibility for an underbilling
when determining whether the utility may collect an additional
amount due from a customer. Neither negligence nor willful misrepre-
sentation relieves the utility of the right or the responsibility to collect
the rates established by the tariff.2 9
A tariff is legislative in character.30 Once approved by a state public
utility commission, it possesses the same binding effect as a statute.31
Accordingly, rates established by the tariff are mandatory; a utility has
(1976). This rule is needed "to preserve the integrity of the filed rates." Mars Express v.
David Masnik, Inc., 401 F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1968) (citation omitted).
23. 209 Pa. Super. 509, 228 A.2d 218 (1967).
24. Id. at 512, 228 A.2d at 220. The underbilling was attributable to "an error in
billing or inadvertence on the part of the [utility]." Id. at 510-11, 228 A.2d at 219.
25. Id. at 511, 228 A.2d at 219.
26. Id
27. West Penn Power, 209 Pa. Super. at 511, 228 A.2d at 220.
28. Id. (quoting Allegheny County Light Co. v. Thomas, 31 Pa. Super. 102 (1906)).
29. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Sankey Bros., 67 IMI. App. 3d 435, 438, 384 N.E.2d 543,
545 (1976) (quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 98 (1915)).
30. See, e.g., Haverhill Gas Co. v. Findlen, 357 Mass. 417, 258 N.E. 2d 294, 298
(1970) (holding that gas company had no discretion to charge rates other than estab-
lished by statute); accord Fry Trucking Co. v. Shenandoah Quarry, Inc., 628 F.2d 1360,
1363 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that a carrier cannot waive or modify legally applicable
tariffs).
31. See, Illinois Cent. Gulf R. v. Golden Triangle Wholesale Gas Co., 586 F.2d 588,
592 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing the potential for rate discrimination if carriers could
modify their tariffs); Southern Pac. Co. v. Valley Frosted Foods Co., 178 Pa. Super.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol39/iss1/4
MISTAKEN UTILITY UNDERCHARGE
no discretion to change them unless the change is presented to and
approved by the regulatory commission.32 The "unrelenting ' 33 rule
provides that a utility may not (1) contract away a statutory duty,34 (2)
be estopped from enforcing a "statutorily declared public policy inter-
est,"3 5 or (3) alter its statutory duties by negligent or willful
misrepresentations.3 6
This result should not really be surprising. Courts usually hold the
doctrine of equitable estoppel inapplicable to the government.37 In
other words, estoppel cannot supplant the duties imposed upon a pub-
lic agency, 38 nor can it frustrate properly enacted legislative declara-
tions of public policy designed to promote the public good.3 9
The comparison of utility tariffs to statutes further illuminates the
operation of the rule against estoppel in the utility undercharge con-
text. Estoppel requires a representation by the party against whom es-
toppel is urged upon. Further, the injured party must have reasonably
and detrimentally relied upon the representation. A utility's tariff,
217, 221, 116 A.2d 70, 71 (1955) (stating that nothing will prevent the collection of the
full and proper rate).
32. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915).
33. Southern Pac. Co. v. Valley Frosted Foods Co., 178 Pa. Super. 217, 221, 116
A.2d 70, 71 (1955).
34. West Penn Power Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 209 Pa. Super. 509, 512,
228 A.2d 218, 220 (1967). See also, Northern Wis. Produce Co. v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry., 203 Wis. 549, 234 N.W. 726 (1931) (characterizing carrier tariffs as in the nature of
statutory obligations).
35. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Jet Asphalt Corp., 132 A.D.2d 296,
303, 522 N.Y.S.2d 124, 128 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
36. Fry Trucking Co. v. Shenandoah Quarry, Inc., 628 F.2d 1360, 1363 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
37. K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, §§ 17.01-.05, .07-.08 (1959). But see
K. DAVIS, supra §§ 17.06, .09.
38. See 10A E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.103, n.10 (3d ed.)
(estoppel may not be used against public agencies to "hinder, restrict or suppress public,
governmental rights or powers"). But see Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co. of California,
716 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Cal. 1988); W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. N.J. Dep't ofTransp., 116
N.J. 543, 562 A.2d 222 (1989) (acknowledging that equitable estoppel may be invoked
against public entities to prevent manifest injustice). The Union Oil court held that in
order to assert estoppel against the government, a party must establish that the govern-
ment engaged in affirmative misconduct beyond mere negligence, and that the injustice
to the party would outweigh the harm to the public interest if the government is es-
topped. Union Oil, 716 F. Supp. at 436.
39. An excellent example of the balancing required between the protection of public
policy and the rights of the individual is found in the California appellate decision, In re
Back, 214 Cal. App. 3d 372, 262 Cal. Rptr. 608 (Ct. App. 1989).
1991]
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however, is publicly filed. As with statutes, a consumer is charged with
knowledge of the tariff regardless of actual knowledge." Given the
consumer's constructive knowledge of the entire contents of a utility's
tariff, a utility's misrepresentation-negligent, willful or merely mis-
taken--cannot generate any reasonable reliance.41 Whatever the util-
ity's statements regarding its rates, the consumer is charged with
knowledge of the actual contents of the tariff, and therefore, of the
actual rates.42
This reasoning works only if the dispute leading to the underbilling
involves a misquotation of rates. For example, the utility may repre-
sent that a rate remains at one level, when the actual rate reflects a
higher one.43 In that case, the theory that the consumer must be
charged with knowledge of the true rate may have some legitimacy.
The theory breaks down, however, when the issue is factual." In that
situation, the utility may be in a unique position to know the facts of
the case to the exclusion of the customer,45 thus fortifying the estoppel
argument.
Just as the actions of the utility in leading to the mistake are consid-
ered irrelevant to whether the undercharge may later be collected, the
impact of the mistake on the customer likewise is not considered. Even
if subsequent collection inflicts substantial hardship on the underbilled
consumer, the utility must collect it. In Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co. v. Maxwell,46 the Supreme Court established that ignorance of
rates provides no excuse for the failure to pay or. charge the filed rate.4'
40. Cf., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-85 (1947) (holding
claimants under the Federal Crop Insurance Act to have constructive knowledge of
applicable regulations).
41. kd.
42. See, e.g., Interstate Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Wright Brokerage Co., 539
S.W.2d 764 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (concluding that published tariffs are open to all and
thus parties to freight contract are conclusively bound to have constructive knowledge).
43. This may occur, for example, if a utility states that a household is eligible for a
regular residential rate when later it is discovered that the household should have been
on a higher electric heating rate.
44. See supra note 1. Moreover, it is not uncommon for utilities to fail to multiply
meter readings by the requisite factor of ten to obtain a proper bill from the meter
reading.
45. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
46. 237 U.S. 94 (1915). Maxwell involved a suit brought by the railroad to recover
an alleged undercharge of $58.30 on the sale of railroad tickets. Id. at 95.
47. Id. at 97.
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Recognizing the potential for hardship in some cases, the Court articu-
lated the need for such a strict rule "to prevent unjust
discrimination."4
Equitable principles such as estoppel do not relieve utility customers
from liability for an undercharge. In L X. L. Stores Co. v. Success Mar-
kets,49 for example, the customer received an erroneous electric bill.
The face of one of the meters at Success Markets' commercial estab-
lishment provided the statement that the kilowatt hours (KWH) regis-
tered on the meter must be multiplied by ten to obtain a correct bill.5"
For twenty-eight months, I. X. L. correctly read the meter, but ne-
glected to make the appropriate calculation. Consequently, I. X. L.
charged Success Markets only one-tenth of the actual electrical current
generated. 5 Nevertheless, I. X. L. billed the difference to Success,
which refused to pay.
Success challenged the supplemental bill on the ground that I. X. L.
was estopped to charge the additional amounts. Not only did Success
pay employee salaries, wages, and bonuses based on available profits,52
it also sub-leased space at a rent lower than would have been required
to compensate for the higher electric bill.5" Success further contended
that the higher bill would have reduced its net profit, resulting in de-
creased state and federal income taxes.
While the court acknowledged basic estoppel doctrine in L X. L.
Stores,54 it recognized two important limits. First, the court noted
both parties' equal opportunity to determine the true billing conditions
48. Id. Accord Pittsburgh Cin., Chi. & St. L. Ry. v. Fink, 250 U.S. 577, 582 (1919)
(instances of individual hardship cannot change the policy that Congress has embodied
in a statute to secure uniformity in charges for transportation); Illinois Cent. Gulf P-R.
Co. v. Golden Triangle Wholesale Gas Co., 586 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting
that individual hardship is not a defense to the application of tariffs because to do so
would undermine the policy of uniformity of charges that underlies the Interstate Com-
merce Act).
49. 98 Utah 160, 97 P.2d 577 (1939).
50. The multiplication was not necessary to obtain a correct bill from the other
three meters. Id. at 162, 97 P.2d at 578.
51. Id. at 162-63, 97 P.2d at 578. All parties acknowledged the good faith of all
other parties. Nevertheless, Success argued that I. X. L. knew the proper billing
method and did not follow it while Success didn't know. Id. at 163, 97 P.2d at 579.
52. Id. at 165, 97 P.2d at 580.
53. Id. at 163-64, 97 P.2d at 579-80. Success charged a rent of $150. Success ar-
gued that a higher electric bill would have required a rent of $200 per month. Id.
54. Id. at 164, 97 P.2d at 580. Because the dispute was not directly with the utility,
however, the court addressed the claim of estoppel. Id. at 166, 97 P.2d at 580. Utah
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with reasonable diligence.55 The court reasoned that when the "real
facts [are] equally or sufficiently open for his convenient ascertainment,
but he has chosen not to take the trouble to observe them, he must
suffer the loss."56 Second, the court determined that the doctrine of
estoppel cannot be used as "a weapon of assault."'57 The court then
found Success Markets' change of position speculative. Accordingly,
the court did not find sufficient basis to invoke equitable estoppel.58
Rather, reliance upon the speculative change of position would "be
more in the nature of a sword cutting off the rights of [I. X. L.] who
has served [Success] with power and is now attempting to obtain
payment." 59
A New Jersey court obtained similar results on similar facts in
Mayor and Council of Vineland v. Fowler Waste Manufacturing Co.6'
In Vineland, as in I X. L. Stores, the seller's employee failed to multi-
ply the meter reading by ten. As a result, for two years, the seller
rendered bills for only one-tenth of the actual electricity used.61 After
paying the original bills, Fowler Waste refused to pay the subsequent
bills for the remaining nine-tenths.62
Power and Light was not even a party to the proceeding. I. X. L. represented the lessor
and Success Markets represented the lessee.
55. Id. at 166, 97 P.2d at 580.
56. Id. Despite its holding, the court rhetorically queried:
[D]id [Success Markets] assume the duty of calculating the number of kilowatt
hours? Is that the duty of each subscriber of power, water, gas etc. to determine his
individual account and check if the utility has figured correctly the amount of
power, water, gas etc. used when a statement is submitted to them?
Id. The court's concern may take on added significance when the consumer is an indi-
vidual rather than a business. For example, the National Assessment of Educational
Progress found that a large portion of the adult population is unable to perform basic
consumer math. In one study, only 39% of the adults tested were able to compare
different-sized containers to determine the best price. In the same study, only 32% of
the adults were able to determine the square foot unit cost of housing space. Only 35%
of adults were able to determine the unit cost of a utility bill. National Assessment of
Educational Progress, Mathematics Report No. 04-MA-02, at 1-3 (June 1975).
57. L X. L Stores, 98 Utah at 167, 97 P.2d at 580.
58. Id. at 167, 97 P.2d at 581. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Au-
burndale School Sys., 705 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tenn. 1986) (estoppel cannot be invoked to
contravene public policy).
59. L X. L Stores Co., 98 Utah at 160, 167, 97 P.2d at 580 (1939).
60. 86 N.J.L. 342, 90 A. 1054 (1914).
61. Id. at 343, 90 A. 1054.
62. Id See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of a similar
case involving natural gas undercharge.
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Claiming that the cost of power was a factor in deciding the price of
its product, Fowler Waste pleaded equitable estoppel as a defense.63
Fowler Waste argued that because it sold its product at prices based
upon the lower cost calculation during the two-year period, it would be
inequitable to later subject it to the loss incident to a change in its
product cost. The loss, Fowler Waste argued, would result from a mis-
take for which it was in no way accountable." 4
The court rejected the estoppel defense, reasoning that a party "can-
not in good conscience throw upon the other a loss to himself which
resulted from his own carelessness quite as much as from the other's
innocent mistake.",65 In making its determination, the court noted that
Fowler Waste's officers and employees could freely inspect the meter
which was located on its premises. Further, an accurate reading of the
meter did not require any particular technical knowledge.66 Accord-
ingly, the court found the real facts sufficiently accessible to Fowler
Waste's "convenient ascertainment, but that he ha[d] chosen not to
take the trouble to observe them." 67
The Vineland court's skepticism regarding the damages claimed by
Fowler Waste represents a significant factor in the court's decision.
The court observed that at the end of the underbilled period, Fowler
Waste oversaw a committee of its creditors.68 The court questioned
whether the plaintiff's error affected the prices at which Fowler sold its
products.69 Thus, the court recognized the need for a direct causal
connection between the mistake and the change in position. 70 The
63. Vineland, 86 N.J.L. at 343, 90 A. at 1054.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 344-45, 90 A. at 1055.
66. Id. at 346, 90 A. at 1055.
67. Id. at 345, 90 A. at 1055.
68. Id. at 347, 90 A. at 1056.
69. Id. at 347, 90 A. at 1056. The court observed:
The important fact involved in the estoppel claim was that defendant would have
established and successfully charged higher prices for its commodities than it did
establish and charge if the error complained of had not occurred. All of the mat-
ters inquired about in the questions objected to tended to show an actual condition
of affairs making it most unlikely that defendant would have done anything of the
kind * ** on the contrary, if it could have sold its products at a higher price than it
did, there were ample and much more urgent reasons for so doing than the one
which it is now claimed would, if it had known of it, have caused it to do so.
Id. 90 A. at 1056.
70. In this case, charging a lower price constituted Fowler's change in position.
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court concluded that knowledge of the mistake must result in a differ-
ent course of action 71 by the party invoking an equitable estoppel
defense.72
Two lessons can be learned for low-income advocates from these
cases. First, there must be a basis upon which to decide that the mis-
take induced some client action. The client must argue that she would
have taken a different course of action had she known of the mistake.
The alternative course of action must be available to the client and
capable of being done but for the lack of knowledge of the mistake.
The client must establish the direct causal connection between her lack
of knowledge and change in position. Would the client have spent less
money on food or clothes but for the mistaken underbilling? Would
the client have moved to a less expensive apartment but for the mis-
taken underbilling? Would the client have applied for federal fuel
assistance but for the mistaken underbilling? Would the client have
reduced her energy consumption but for the mistaken underbilling?
Second, the mistake must be of a nature that the client did not know
of it or could not have discovered it through some reasonable effort on
her part. Thus, if the seller reads the meter incorrectly, but the meter
is readily accessible to the client and easy to read without a technical
background, then the client may recover nothing. 73 Moreover, a dra-
matic change in utility costs without a similar change in consumption
puts the consumer on notice that something merits inquiry.74 It re-
mains unclear whether a court would apply an objective test in decid-
ing this issue or whether the court would examine the individual utility
customer's characteristics such as education."
71. In this case, charging a higher price would indicate knowledge of the mistake.
72. Vineland, 86 N.J.L. at 347, 90 A. at 1056. In the court's words:
[T]he fact the defendant was unable to successfully raise its prices high enough to
meet the demands of the big reasons for so doing which it knew did exist was a fair
ground from which a jury might properly conclude that its failure to raise these
prices was not because of its ignorance of the small reason of which it did not
know.
Id.
73. I. X. L. Stores Co. v. Success Mkts., 98 Utah 160, 165, 97 P.2d 577, 579-80
(1939) (an inability to conveniently ascertain true information is required to prevail in
an estoppel action).
74. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Jet Asphalt Corp., 132
A.D.2d 296, 300-01, 522 N.Y.S.2d 124, 127; see also infra note 78 and accompanying
text.
75. See supra note 56 regarding the impact of educational levels.
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In this regard, distinguishing between mistakes in the rate charged
and mistakes in the amount of energy consumed becomes necessary.
There is a common distinction made between mistakes of law and mis-
takes of fact. For example, if there is a mistake in the rate charged, the
consumer is presumed to have knowledge of the rate. Due to the lack
of reasonable reliance, no estoppel could lie against the disconnection
of service.7 6 However, a factual mistake, uniquely within the province
of the utility to reasonably discover or prevent, allows possible applica-
tion of estoppel principles.
An Illinois court held that a utility might be prevented from collect-
ing an undercharge on grounds of estoppel. In Illinois Power Co. v.
Champaign Asphalt Co., the utility sought to recover an undercharge
resulting from an allegedly defective meter.7 8 While largely addressing
the construction of specific state regulations,7 9 the court, in dicta, did
distinguish between situations in which the utility sought to recover
payment for erroneously undercharging the defendant and situations in
which the mistake related to quantity or volume supplied and used.80
Errors as to rate levels are akin to mistakes of law, knowledge of which
is imputed to the person raising the estoppel defense. Errors as to
quantity billed, however, are akin to mistakes of fact, knowledge of
which may not be imputed to the consumer.A
III. EQUITABLE LIMITS ON COLLECTION MECHANISMS
A mechanism effectuating the equitable principles of estoppel and
mistake while simultaneously respecting the utility's obligation to col-
lect its codified rates exists. Allowing the utility to collect the underbil-
ling, but prohibiting it from disconnecting the utility service, represents
one such collection device. The utility then would be permitted to use
any other legitimate collection device. 2 Accordingly, both the utility
76. See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (denial of the defense of estoppel
generally follows the same reasoning for the denial of counter-claims).
77. 19 Ill. App. 3d 74, 310 N.E.2d 463 (1974).
78. Tests showed that the meter registered roughly 50 percent of the electricity ac-
tually used. Billing records showed a drop in billed usage of approximately the same
magnitude. Id. at 75-76, 310 N.E.2d at 464.
79. Id. at 82, 310 N.E.2d at 468-69.
80. Id. at 82, 310 N.E.2d at 469 (dicta).
81. See infra note 139 and accompanying text (utility held accountable for damages
due to mistake of fact).
82. It is beneficial to compare this approach with the Public Utility Commission of
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and the consumer share the burdens of the utility's mistake.
This proposal comports with recent trends in the doctrine regulating
the collection of undercharges by freight carriers. While recognizing
the right to collect the undercharge, cases involving freight carriers
place restrictions on the manner of collection. In this fashion, the
courts recently have softened the historically absolute rule on un-
dercharge collections. Instead of ipsofacto permitting the collection of
an undercharge, judicial limits have been imposed. An examination of
carrier cases can best provide the requisite guidance.8 3
Courts diverge from the strict principle of collecting undercharges in
instances where the dispute regards prepayment of shipping charges.
Where the carrier erroneously represents that the consignor has pre-
paid such charges, the carrier may not seek to collect the underpay-
ment from the consignee."4 In these cases, the historical basis for
rejecting an estoppel defense does not apply.8 5 Moreover, courts have
held that full payment of tariff charges remains the principal concern
of the anti-discrimination provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act.8 6
This rule prevails at both the federal8 7 and state level.88
Ohio's (PUCO) decision to adopt a percentage of income plan (PIP). In adopting that
plan, PUCO held:
This plan does not constitute income redistribution because those customers
who qualify for the plan are still liable for any arrearages on their bills. There is no
debt forgiveness. The Commission is just foreclosing one method by which a utility
may exercise its rights to collect for the debt. The utility still has available to it all
of its other remedies at law. Because the customer is still liable for his/her arrear-
ages, the Commission's percent of income payment plan does not constitute free
service or a rebate as charged by opponents of the plan. The plan is not
confiscatory.
In re Investigation into Long-Term Solutions Concerning Disconnections of Gas and
Electric Service in Winter Emergencies, No. 83-303-GE-COI, slip op., at 14 (Nov. 23,
1983).
83. The courts often rely upon undercharge cases regarding freight carriers in de-
ciding undercharging issues for public utilities. See supra note 20.
84. See, eg., Interstate Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Wright Brokerage Co., 539
S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
85. The customer is charged with knowledge of the tariff and thus has no basis for a
reasonable reliance on assertions that the rate is other than what is actually in the tariff.
Id. at 766. However, the customer does have a right to rely on the customer's statement
that freight charges have been prepaid because the matter of prepayment is not pub-
lished for public notice. Id
86. Id. at 766-67 (emphasis in original).
87. The leading case is Davis v. Akron Feed and Milling Co., 296 F. 675 (6th Cir.
1924). Accord Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Campbell Soup Co., 455 F.2d 1219 (8th
Cir. 1972); Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Admiral Corp., 442 F.2d 56 (7th
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Courts should import the rationale underlying these decisions to
prohibit the use of service disconnections as a collection device in un-
dercharge situations. Like the carrier cases, utility collection of full
tariff charges represents the concern of the utility anti-discrimination
provisions. Such statutes, however, do not contemplate what the col-
lection mechanism shall be. Like the carrier cases, a ban on the use of
the disconnection of service as a collection mechanism merely regulates
the manner of debt collection while still acknowledging the debt's
existence. Several lines of analysis support the legitimacy of this
approach.
A. Mandatory vs. Discretionary Practices
Courts reason that a utility must collect its mistaken undercharges
because it has no discretion to charge a lesser rate than that contained
in its tariffs.89 Moreover, the equitable doctrine of estoppel, in this sit-
uation, may not override the statutory requirements that rates not be
less than those contained in the filed tariff.'
The mandatory obligation regarding filed rates, however, contrasts
with the expressly permissive activity of disconnecting utility service.
For instance, the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co.,91 held that utility disconnections did not represent
"state action" because the state did not order such activity.92 Rather,
the utility solely and independently decided whether to disconnect its
93services.
In Iowa Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition v. Iowa State CommerceCommission,94 the Iowa Supreme Court discussed a utility's discretion
Cir. 1971); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. National Milling Co., 276 F.Supp. 367, aff'd, 409
F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1969).
88. See, eg., Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Hofberger, 259 Ark. 322, 532 S.W.2d
759 (1976); Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Eddy, 266 Or. 385, 513 P.2d
1161 (1973); Tom Hicks Trans. Co. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Texas Inc., 482 S.W.2d
364 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Lyon Van Lines, Inc. v. Cole, 9 Wash. App. 382, 512 P.2d
1108 (1973).
89. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the mandatory
nature of utility tariffs.
90. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (strong public policy against discrimi-
nating rates finds its source in state statutes).
91. 419 U.S. 345 (1978).
92. Id. at 357.
93. Id.
94. 335 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1983).
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with greater detail and articulated the prevailing rule." The court held
that state agency rules governing the disconnection of service did not
constitute "state action" because they merely regulated what is other-
wise a permissive business decision by the utility.96 The court reasoned
that state encouragement did not constitute state action.97
While the "state action" debate is not relevant to the issue at hand,98
the fact that shutoffs are discretionary, not mandatory, takes them out
of the traditional undercharge analysis. Even if a utility may not be
estopped from performing its mandatory duty to collect its un-
dercharges, it may indeed be estopped from using the discretionary tool
of service disconnections in the collection process.
As a result of the discretionary nature of disconnections, restricting
the use of disconnections as a collection mechanism does not run afoul
of the principles articulated in the undercharge cases. Unlike the
mandatory duty to charge the rates present in a utility's filed tariffs,
restricting the use of shutoffs as a collection device impinges upon no
mandatory duty at all. In contrast to the mandatory responsibility to
charge the rates in the filed tariff, the disconnection of service is en-
tirely discretionary. Accordingly, by reason of its negligent or willful
95. Id at 183. See also Taylor v. Consolidated Edison Co., 552 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.
1977); Srack v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 391 F. Supp. 155 (S.D. Iowa 1975). See
generally Comment, Public Utilities and State Action: The Supreme Court Takes a
Stand, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 622 (1975); Comment, Constitutional Law-State Action-
Termination of Electrical Service by Privately Owned Utility, Does Not Constitute State
Action for Purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 EMORY L.J. 511 (1975); Com-
ment, Public Utilities-State Action and Informal Due Process after Jackson, 53 N.C.L.
REv. 817 (1975).
96. Iowa Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition, 335 N.W.2d at 183.
97. Id. In holding that no state action existed, the Iowa Supreme Court stated:
The commission explained its purpose was merely to establish reasonable proce-
dures to be followed by utilities that elect to terminate services to customers who
fail to pay their bills... Nor does the state's encouragement of collection of delin-
quent bills convert the limitations to state action. Disconnections remain merely a
permissive device for utilities to use in attempting to achieve that objective. Com-
mission policy favoring collection of delinquent accounts has resulted in enlarge-
ment of the scope of permission to discontinue service, but it has not made
disconnection for nonpayment mandatory.
Id.
98. The notion that "state action" in the shutoff situation depends upon the state
"ordering" the shutoffhas been sharply criticized. See Comment, Constitutional Law-
Notices of Utility Shutoffs Need Not Meet Due Process Standards Where Rules Promul-
gated by the Iowa State Commerce Commission Do Not Create a State Action by Utility
Companies-Iowa Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition v. Iowa State Commerce Commission,
33 DRAKE L. RV. 459 (1983-84).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol39/iss1/4
MISTAKEN UTILITY UNDERCHARGE
mistake, a utility could be estopped from disconnecting service because
disconnection represents a discretionary action. Even in situations
lacking both willful misconduct and negligence, the utilities could be
prevented from exercising their right to this otherwise discretionary
remedy in order to share the consequences of the innocent mistake.9 9
In sum, while the right to collect in an undercharge case is unques-
tionable, the manner of collection may be regulated. Just as a carrier
has the obligation to collect the undercharged freight fees from some-
one, but not from the consignor in particular, the utility has the obliga-
tion to collect the undercharge somehow, but not to use the
disconnection of service, in particular, as a collection device.
B. Collateral Matters
Limiting the use of disconnections in the case of underbilling accords
with black letter law holding that a utility may not disconnect service
for a "collateral" matter." For example, a utility may not disconnect
residential service for nonpayment of a business account,101 nor may it
disconnect service at one address for nonpayment of service at a differ-
ent address.102 Similarly, a utility may not disconnect service for non-
payment of amounts owing toward either appliances °1" or a different
type of utility service. 1"4
99. "[l]e who, by his language or conduct, leads another to do what he would not
otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the
expectations upon which he acted." I. X. L. Stores Co. v. Success Mkts., 98 Utah 160,
166, 97 P.2d 577, 580 (1939).
100. See Annotation, Right of Public Utility Corporation to Refuse Its Service Be-
cause of Collateral Matter Not Related to That Service, 55 A.L.R. 771 (1928) (noting
that caselaw uniformly holds that a public utility cannot refuse to render the service,
which it is authorized by its charter to furnish, because of some collateral matter not
related to that service).
101. See, e.g., Northern Ohio Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 9 Ohio St. 2d 153,
154, 224 N.E.2d 528, 529 (1967) (unless tariff clearly provides for termination as a
collection device, telephone company may not discontinue service for nonpayment); Jo-
sephson v. Mountain Bell, 576 P.2d 850, 852-53 (Utah 1978) (same).
102. See Annotation, Right of Public Utility to Discontinue or Refuse Service at One
Address Because of Refusal to Pay for Past Service Rendered at Another, 95 A.L.R. 556
(1935); see also Annotation, Right of Public Utility to Deny Service at One Address Be-
cause of Failure to Pay for Past Service at Another, 73 A.L.R. 3d 1292 (1976).
103. See, eg., Garner v. City of Aurora, 149 Neb. 295, 302, 30 N.W.2d 917, 920
(1948).
104. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. See generally Annotation, Right of
Municipality to Refuse Services Provided by It to Resident for Failure of Resident to Pay
for Another Unrelated Service, 60 A.L.R. 3d 714 (1974); Annotation, Right to Cut Off
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In each instance above, courts restrict the utility in the mechanisms
available to seek collection. Each case recognizes that customers owe
money to the utility, and that collection may be undertaken. The law
also recognizes, however, the essential nature of utility service and the
inherently coercive nature of the disconnection of service as a collec-
tion mechanism.105 Accordingly, the law traditionally bars the use of
that collection mechanism for "collateral" matters.
1 °6
A past undercharge exemplifies a matter "collateral" to any current
customer liability. In general, "collateral" matters include matters
that bear no relation to the current utility service being offered to the
customer. 107 "Collateral" matters relating to particular utility serv-
ices, however, remain unclear. The Iowa Supreme Court, for example,
defines a "collateral" matter as "a wholly separate and independent
transaction."° 8
Other courts have adopted similar approaches. The Nebraska courts
Water Supply Because of Failure to Pay Sewer Service Charge, 26 A.L.R. 2d 1359
(1952).
105. As one court has stated:
The parties are not upon equal ground. The city, as a water company, cannot do as
it will with its water. It owes a duty to each consumer. The consumer, once taken
on to the system, becomes dependent on that system for a prime necessity of busi-
ness, comfort, health, and even life. He must have the pure water daily and hourly.
To suddenly deprive him of this water, in order to force him to pay an old bill
claimed to be unjust, puts him at an enormous disadvantage. He cannot wait for
the water. He must surrender and swallow his choking sense of injustice. Such a
power in a water company or municipality places the consumer at its mercy. It can
always claim that some old bill is unpaid. The receipt may have been lost, the
collector may have embezzled the money; yet the consumer must pay it again, and
perhaps still again. He cannot resist, lest he lose his water.
Wood v. Auburn, 87 Me. 287, 292-93, 32 A. 906, 907-08 (1895).
106. To recognize the debt, while barring a particular remedy, is akin to what hap-
pens pursuant to a "general" statute of limitations.
Most states have enacted what are referred to as 'general' statutes of limitations.
These statutes provide that at the end of the statutory period, no action in law (or
suit in equity) can be maintained based upon the debt in question. However-and
it is a big however-these 'general' statutes operate only on the remedies available
to the creditor. While the statute may extinguish the right to enforce a debt, it does
not extinguish the debt itself. As a result, the creditor has every other lawful
means, other than a suit in law or equity, of realizing on the debt.
Colton, Statutes of Limitations: Barring the Delinquent Disconnection of Utility Serice,
23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 3 (May 1989).
107. See generally 1 A. PIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION,
256-57 (1969).
108. Berner v. Interstate Power Co., 244 Iowa 298, 302, 57 N.W.2d 55, 57 (1953).
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hold that a matter is "collateral" if it is an "independent transaction,
not strictly connected with the particular physical service."" One
Louisiana court's definition was somewhat narrower, holding that a
matter is collateral if it is "entirely... unconnected with the particular
service which is being rendered."11 These definitions seem somewhat
circular, however, and advocates may well have to turn to definitions
of "collateral" in other areas of the law for guidance."'
Florida courts provide perhaps the most workable definition of a
"collateral service." Services are not collateral, according to the Flor-
ida courts, if they are "so interlocked that neither can be effective with-
out the other."' 12 Thus, while water and sewer services are not
collateral to each other, water and electric services are collateral." 3
Amounts sought to be collected as a result of mistaken past un-
dercharges fall into the realm of "collateral" matters. Such charges are
akin to charges for a bill at a different address, or a bill for a different
transaction. A bill for past undercharges does not constitute a bill for
services arising in the ordinary course of monthly customer/utility re-
lations. It would thus fall within the "independent transaction" analy-
sis of the aforementioned cases.
In any event, the nonpayment of the mistaken past due amount bears
no relation to the customer's activity toward the utility. Rather, the
customer pays the monthly bills as requested by the utility. The utility
then seeks recoupment for its own past mistake of undercharging the
customer. Consequently, it is appropriate to proscribe the disconnec-
tion of service based upon collateral matters.
Finally, to the extent that a disconnection of service can be analo-
gized to a "forfeiture," estopping a utility from disconnecting service as
a collection device is consistent with contract law.' 14 Professor Corbin
109. Garner v. City of Aurora, 149 Neb. 295, 302, 30 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1948).
110. Hicks v. City of Monroe Util. Comm'n, 237 La. 848, 887, 112 So. 2d 635, 649
(1959) (emphasis in original).
111. This task will be left to another day.
112. Edris v. Sebring Util. Comm'n, 237 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
113. See generally Annotation, Right of Municipality to Refuse Services Provided by
It to Resident for Failure of Resident to Pay for Another Unrelated Service, 60 A.L.R. 3d
714 (1974); Annotation, Right to Cut Off Water Supply Because of Failure to Pay Sewer
Charge, 26 A.L.R. 2d 1359 (1952).
114. Other aspects of a forfeiture are similar to the process of service disconnection.
For example, there must be notice and an opportunity to cure before a forfeiture. El-
sasser v. Wilcox, 286 Or. 775, 779, 596 P.2d 974, 976-77 (1979); Braunstein v. Trottier,
54 Or. App. 687, 695, 635 P.2d 1379, 1384 (1981).
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recognized that "to avoid such a forfeiture, the courts have been very
astute to find and declare the existence of... an estoppel ... [s]uch a
provision will not be enforced if the creditor has in any way contrib-
uted to the default..." 115 Like the collection of arrears for collateral
matters, the courts do not deny the liability, and do not wish to prevent
collection. Rather, courts simply seek to deny the forfeiture. By al-
lowing the collection of a utility undercharge, but preventing the dis-
connection of service as a collection device, courts achieve practically
identical results.
IV. RIGHT TO FILE COUNTER-CLAIM FOR DAMAGES
Most courts deny counter-claims for damages to customers whether
utilities misquote rates willfully, negligently, or merely by mistake.1 16
The courts' denial of counter-claims largely follows the same reasoning
of the denial of the defense of estoppel. Accordingly, courts charge the
consumer with notice of the "true" rate whether or not she actually
knew it.
In Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. Mary,'1 7 a carrier
case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the duly filed rate of the
carrier is the only lawful charge; shippers and travelers are charged
with notice of it, and both parties must abide by it.1I" Indeed, courts
hold that a consumer has as much of a duty as a carrier in determining
the correct rate. Even if a consumer relies on a carrier's representa-
tion, she does so at her peril. Thus, courts charge the consumer with
the knowledge that the carrier could not evade the statutory duty to
collect the full amount of charges lawfully due. 1 9
The denial of counter-claims for damages is further deemed neces-
sary to preserve the statutory policy against rebates. The Marty court
noted the statutory prohibition of rebates regardless of the legal theory
upon which the claims for rebates are based. Further, it stated, "to
hold that the statute affects contract claims only and is not applicable
to tort claims growing out of the rate misquotation would effectually
115. A. CORBIN, supra note 2, § 754.
116. Denver & Rio G. W. R.R. v. Marty, 143 Colo. 496, 499-500, 353 P.2d 1095,
1097 (1960).
117. 143 Colo. 496, 353 P.2d 1095 (1960).
118. Id. at 499-500, 353 P.2d at 1097 (quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Max-
well, 237 U.S. 94, 97, (1915)).
119. Houston & Texas Cent. R.R. v. Johnson, 41 S.W.2d 14, 15-16 (Tex. Ct. App.
1931).
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nullify this statute and the policy set forth therein." 120 The court ad-
ded that the strong policy of the statute would become meaningless if it
could be circumvented merely by developing a different legal theory.121
Courts have been "almost unanimous in holding that no action to re-
cover damages from the carrier will lie, since to do so would amount to
a preferential and unlawful rebate."' 122
The rule, however, may not be as firm as it first appears. Two impor-
tant distinctions may determine the validity of a counter-claim. First,
courts must recognize the distinction between seeking damages equal
to the amount of the undercharge and seeking damages resulting from
the utility's unlawful contract. Second, courts must recognize the dis-
tinction between seeking damages for a mistaken rate quotation and
seeking damages for a mistake of fact leading to an undercharge.
Nonetheless, whatever the legal theory, a consumer is barred from
seeking a rebate through a counterclaim. 123 Thus, defining the type of
damages sought in order to prevent a court from characterizing those
damages as a rebate becomes important. In Houston & Texas Central
Railway Co. v. Johnson,124 for example, the counter-claimant sought
to recover the freight charges.125 As in Marty, the counter-claim al-
leged reliance on the carrer's misquotation of rates "to their damage in
the amount of the difference between the actual freight rate and the
amount which it would have been had the quotation of plaintiff's agent
been correCt."' 12 6
Similarly, in Graves Truck Line, Inc. v. Hy Plains Dressed Beef,
Inc.,127 the plaintiff carrier sued to recover an undercharge. Hy Plains
counter-claimed, asserting that it "had been damaged and was entitled
to a setoff in the entire amount for which it was sued."' 28 The court
denied both of these counter-claims as a matter of law.'29 This type of
damage action simply seeks to undo the fulfillment of the policy which
120. Marty, 143 Colo. at 500, 353 P.2d at 1097.
121. Id. at 500-01, 353 P.2d at 1097.
122. Annotation, Carriers Understatement of Charges Where Discrimination is For-
bidden, 88 A.L.R. 2d 1375, 1392 (1963).
123. Marty, 143 Colo. at 500, 353 P.2d at 1097.
124. 41 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Ct. App. 1931).
125. Id.
126. Marty, 143 Colo. at 497, 353 P.2d at 1095.
127. 204 Kan. 275, 462 P.2d 130 (1969).
128. Id. at 276, 462 P.2d at 132.
129. "The public policy against discriminatory ratemaking precludes a shipper from
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the mandatory collection of tariffed rates seeks to implement. In other
words, one cannot seek the amount of the undercharge as damages.
In contrast, however, actual damages exceeding the amount of the
undercharge are recoverable. A utility customer has a right to seek
compensation for harms experienced resulting from a mistaken un-
derbilling. The recoverable damages are limited, however. A customer
may seek only compensatory damages that directly and proximately
arise out of the utility's mistake-a limit that is placed on any damage
action.
Courts have held that a utility's obligation to collect an underbilling
does not insulate it from consumer counter-claim actions for dam-
ages.13° As the Missouri courts have stated, "although a utility com-
pany must be compensated for the full amount lawfully due it under
the law and the rates fixed by the Public Service Commission, it 'can-
not divorce itself from the consequences of its own failure to use ordi-
nary care to avoid harm to its customers.' ,131 While public policy
requires that any underbilling error be recognized and corrected, it
does not require that all parties stand in equal position to absorb the
consequences of the error.
132
Note, for example, the damages considered by the I X. L. Stores
court: (1) sub-letting a premises for a price made non-compensatory by
the retroactively applied rates; (2) the expenditure of sums of "extra"
money on employee bonuses that would not have been "extra" if the
rates were properly applied in a timely fashion; and (3) the reduction in
taxable income attributable to increased operating expenses.1
33
These damages would have been permissible had they been sought
through a counter-claim.' 34 The customer, however, did not plead the
asserting a claim, counter-claim or defense in an action brought by a carrier to recover
the full legal charges for transportation." Id. at 280, 462 P.2d at 134.
130. See, ag., Laclede Gas Co. v. Solon Gershman, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1976).
131. Id. at 577 (citations omitted).
132. See generally Annotation, Carrier's Right or Liability in Respect of Excess of
Lawful Charge Overcharge Understated Where Discrimination is Forbidden, 83 A.L.R.
245, 267 (1933).
133. I. X. L. Stores Co. V. Success Mkts., 98 Utah 160, 168, 97 P.2d 577, 580-81
(1939).
134. Id. at 169-70, 97 P.2d at 581 (Wolfe, J. concurring). The concurring opinion
explained:
In this case, defendant set up one counterclaim for allowance of the five percent
discount which the Utah Power & Light Company gave the plaintiff. It was al-
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damages, as counter-claims; rather, they were pled as a basis for an
estoppel defense. Because the estoppel defense failed, the court did not
award damages.
135
In sum, courts will generally permit damages not involving efforts to
recoup the undercharges. In effect, a public utility's overcharge con-
verts the provision of service to the involved customer into an unlawful
special contract at a discounted rate. Courts will seek to remedy the
unlawful contract, but that unlawful action cannot insulate the utility
from what otherwise would be its liability. 136 A utility may not hide
behind its own unlawful actions, innocent or not, to avoid paying com-
pensation for the harms that its actions have imposed on others.
13 7
Even when seeking damages is generally permissible, a consumer is
barred from seeking damages based upon a mistake of law. 131 Mis-
takes of fact, however, lead to different results. The Missouri courts
have specifically held, for example, that because an undetectable defect
in the metering device caused the underbilling, the consumer had no
means of discovering the lawfully established rate. Therefore, the util-
ity should be held accountable for any damage caused to the
lowed by the court. He then set up another counterclaim for loss of rentals to a
sublessee. This was disallowed because the court found that it did not appear that
he suffered any such loss as the proximate and natural consequence of the plain-
tiff's mistake. No counterclaim for increased State and Federal income taxes
which were paid by reason of a supposed greater net income was pleaded, except by
way of estoppel; nor was any counterclaim set up showing loss by reason of pay-
ment of increased bonuses to workmen due to supposed greater net profits than
were actually earned. It would seem that had there been the increase in taxes paid
because of the mistake, the amount of such increase might have been mathemati-
cally determined.
Id.
135. Id. at 170, 97 P.2d at 581-82.
136. Note, for example, with regard to carriers:
The fact that a contract of shipment is invalid as violating the Interstate Commerce
Law prohibiting discrimination does not operate as a bar to an action to recover for
loss of, or injury to, the goods by negligence, or for injury due to delay in transpor-
tation, or for damages caused by willfully misrouting the goods so that the shipper
is compelled to pay a much higher rate of freight. Even though the carrier is enti-
tled to recover the rate fixed by the schedule, the rights or the shipper are not in
other respects, not dependent on the special contract, different from what they
would have been had the contract been free from illegality as to rates charged.
13 C.J.S. Carriers § 394 (1972).
137. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
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consumers. 
139
Contrary to this reasoning is the troublesome Wisconsin decision of
Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Berlin Tanning & Manfacturing Co. 1
In Berlin Tanning, a consumer asserted two counter-claims against
Wisconsin Power and Light Company. The first alleged that the cost
of natural gas represented a substantial cost of doing business reflected
in prices charged to consumers. Berlin further asserted that it had no
means of recovering that cost from its own customers and that an oper-
ating loss exactly equal to the amount of the deficit would result.
1 41
This first counter-claim is nearly identical to those asserted in Johnson,
Marty and Hy Plains Beef. Thus, not surprisingly, the court denied the
counter-claim as seeking an unlawful rebate.
The Berlin Tanning court's treatment of the second counter-claim is
more disturbing. Berlin asserted in its second counter-claim that it
purchased certain shares of its own capital stock during the period of
the undercharge. The purchase price of that stock was computed and
paid based upon the book value of the stock at the time. Berlin argued
that if the energy delivered by Wisconsin Power and Light had been
properly charged, the book value would have been less. Berlin further
argued that it had no recourse against the seller of the stock to recover
the "excess" price paid.142
The Berlin Tanning court also denied the second counter-claim
holding that the state's antidiscrimination statute required denial as a
matter of law. The Wisconsin court stated that if the defendant's pleas
were recognized as either setoffs or defenses, the defendant would have
paid less than the proper rate for gas. 143 The court refused to acknowl-
edge a difference between reducing the amount to be paid plaintiff
through an estoppel defense arising out of negligent billing, and reduc-
ing the amount through a setoff of damages that resulted from negli-
gent billing. 144
The companion case to Berlin Tanning involved an even more egre-
gious situation. In Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Berlin Laundry
139. Laclede Gas Co. v. Solon Gershman, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976). See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
140. 275 Wis. 554, 83 N.W.2d 147 (1957). See also Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v.
Berlin Laundry Co., 275 Wis. 562, 83 N.W.2d 152 (1957).
141. Berlin Tanning, 275 Wis. at 556, 83 N.W.2d at 149.
142. Id. at 557, 83 N.W.2d at 149.
143. Id. at 559, 83 N.W.2d at 150.
144. Id. at 561, 83 N.W.2d at 151.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol39/iss1/4
MISTAKEN UTILITY UNDERCHARGE
Co.,14 the defendant consumer entered into a contract with a heating
contractor for the installation of gas fired equipment. The contract
provided that if the gas fired equipment could not be operated at a cost
comparable to or less than the cost of operating the coal burning equip-
ment, the gas fired equipment would be removed and the coal fired
equipment reinstalled at no cost to the defendant. Based upon the bills
received from the utility, Berlin Laundry erroneously released the con-
tractor from liability under his guaranty.146 The court denied Berlin
Laundry's counter-claim on the same basis as Berlin Tanning.147
The Berlin Laundry and Berlin Tanning decisions portray an errone-
ous application of the law. In those cases, there was not an erroneous
quotation of rates. Instead, the utility failed to multiply the meter
reading by ten to calculate the proper bill. The disputed amount equal-
led 90 percent which remained unpaid. In this instance, the defendant
knew the tariff rates. The dispute arose, however, over the level of
utility usage. The issue, being factual, left the court with no basis for
imputing that knowledge to the defendant. Moreover, the action was
for damages independent of the contractual arrangement between the
utility and the customer. Specifically, the customer sought compensa-
tion for injury suffered at the hands of the utility, not a rebate of the
undercharge which the utility later sought to collect.
Berlin's damage claims represented neither a discount nor a rebate of
previously paid charges. Instead, they constituted a reasonable compu-
tation of the harms arising from Wisconsin Power and Light's wrong-
ful billing. Compensatory damages would not have given Berlin a
preference. Rather, they would have only made Berlin whole. The
court's denial of the counter-claim not only deprived Berlin of the full
services for which it had paid-including timely and accurate billing-
but also failed to compensate Berlin for additional harms resulting
from that failure.
V. NEED FOR A NEW DOCTRINE
The existing problems in the traditional rules demonstrate a need for
a new doctrine to govern collections of mistaken billings. This new
doctrine should encompass three parts. First, the courts should relax
their ban on the use of estoppel to govern the collection of un-
145. 275 Wis. 562, 83 N.W.2d 152 (1957).
146. Id. at 563, 83 N.W.2d at 152.
147. Id. at 563, 83 N.W.2d at 153.
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dercharges to low-income households. The theory underlying a denial
of the estoppel defense provides that a utility's nondiscrimination stat-
ute prohibits the grant of rebates or preference. This theory may be
true when a utility has rendered identical service. If the level of service
varies, however, the discrimination arises by charging an identical rate,
not by charging a different rate. Permitting a utility to render inferior
or inadequate service, while forbidding relief from rates paid for ade-
quate service, does not prevent discrimination, but furthers it.
Second, courts and commissions should allow the rebate of some
portion of previously charged rates in those instances where the utility
has failed to provide the service upon which the rates are based. Fi-
nally, a utility should be liable for all damages proximately caused by
its rendering of inadequate service. Courts should clearly provide relief
for consumers who are damaged because of a utility's delay in provid-
ing complete and accurate bills, so long as the claim for damages is not
simply a claim for a rebate of the amount of the undercharged bill.
A. The Underlying Theory: A Utility's Service Obligation
The "service" a utility provides to its customers consists of several
components. 148 Unquestionably, the utility must provide the units of
energy, water, or telecommunication. A utility, however, maintains an
obligation to provide more than those units as part of its service; it has
a further obligation to provide correct bills. The provision of a bill is
not superfluous, it is an essential part of a utility's service to the cus-
tomer.149 Obtaining a regular and correct meter reading, for example,
as opposed to mere estimates, represents an obligation enforced by
many commissions. 5 ' In short, timely and accurate billing is part of
148. Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and
Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 312, 313 (1962).
149. See, e.g., Re Davenport Water Co., 76 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 209, 232
(Iowa Comm. C. 1968) (approving rate adjustment to compensate for new billing
procedure).
150. See, e.g., 52 PA. CODE § 56.12 (1989). Section 56.12 reads in pertinent part:
Except as provided in this section, a utility shall render bills based on actual meter
readings by utility company personnel * * * Where a utility bills on a monthly
basis, it may estimate usage of service every other billing month, so long as the
utility provides each ratepayer with the opportunity to read the meter and report
the quantity of usage in lieu of such estimated bill.
Id.
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the utility's obligation to render "reasonably adequate service." 15 1
More importantly, timely and accurate billing encompasses part of the
utility's service that each utility customer buys.1 52 Indeed, the cost of
billing and collection is part of the rates charged to consumers.
1 53
In rendering "reasonably adequate service," the utility should com-
ply with the temporal element implicit in the definition of "adequacy."
It does not suffice for a utility to provide the demanded services "some-
time." The utility is obligated to provide the service at the time and
place demanded. 154 Tardy service and timely service are not
equivalents. 5 5 A utility's delay in the provision of water, gas or elec-
tric service may well result in compensable damages to consumers. 56
Moreover, even if found not to be part of the utility's statutory or
common law service obligation, the provision of timely and accurate
billing remains an enforceable obligation. If the utility tariff promises
timely and accurate billing, for example, that obligation has become
part of the "service" which the consumer has contracted to receive. If
a utility fails to perform the services which it has contractually agreed
to provide, and for which it is charging, then charging the same rate to
persons underserved and to persons adequately served is unjust and
discriminatory. 57 Accordingly, in addition to specific retroactive re-
151. See infra note 157 and accompanying text explaining that a utility's tariffs are
part of its contract with its customers, and, as such, are binding on the utility.
152. The "purchase" of this service is most explicit in the telecommunications in-
dustry, where billing and collection services have been examined in detail. See In re
Detariffing of Billing and Collection Servs., 102 F.C.C.2d 1150 (1986) (Order Adopting
Rules); In re Detariffing of Billing and Collection Servs., 100 F.C.C.2d 607 (1985) (No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking).
153. See FERC Customer Records and Collection Expenses, 18 C.F.R. Pt. 101,
§ 903 (electric utilities) (1990); FERC Customer Records and Collection Expenses, 18
C.F.R. Pt. 201, § 903 (natural gas utilities) (1990).
154. See generally Annotation, Liability of Electric Company for Interruption, Fail-
ure, or Inadequacy of Power, 4 A.L.R. 3d 594 (1965); Annotation, Duty of Public Utility
to Notify Patron in Advance of Temporary Suspension of Service, 52 A.L.R. 1078 (1928).
155. Note, supra note 148, at 313 (noting the statutory duty to provide continuous
efficient service).
156. See generally 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Utilities § 313 (1972); Annotation, Liabil-
ity of Gas, Electric or Water Company for Delay in Commencing Service, 97 A.L.R. 838
(1935).
157. When a customer's bill fails to reflect the actual amount owed, they are receiv-
ing service which is inferior to that which properly billed customers receive. A utility's
subsequent attempt to recover payment for unreceived service contravenes the statutory
policy against discriminatory rate making.
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bates for inadequate service, 151 prospective rate relief has been
delayed159 or denied altogether' 6° due to the provision of inadequate
service.161
B. Rebates For Inadequate Service
Prospective rate relief, however, may provide an inadequate remedy
in individual cases. In this situation, the customer adversely affected
by inadequate service should receive a rebate. A rebate for inadequate
service is not statutorily prohibited. Indeed, the grant of rebates or
discounts for inadequate service commonly occurs in public utility reg-
ulation. The Nebraska Supreme Court set forth the basic principle in
In re Application No. 30466.162 In Application No. 30466, the court
held that a public service commission has a right to force a utility to
provide the service for which its rates have been fixed. 163 The court
reasoned that this right is inherent in the public service commission's
regulatory power. 64
158. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Re Long Beach Motor Bus Co., 12 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 198
(Cal. P.U.C. 1955) (transit company's rate increase conditioned upon improved ser-
vice); Re Norwalk Indep. Tel. Co., 27 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 17 (Wis. P.S.C. 1959)
(telephone company's rate increase contingent upon plant repairs).
160. See, e.g., Re Arkansas TeL Co., 79 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 241 (Ark. P.S.C.
1969) (a substandard service may afford a basis for denial of a request for higher rates);
Accord, Re General Telegraph Co. of the Southwest, 89 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 92, 99-
100 (Ark. P.S.C. 1971).
161. Again, state commissions have allowed differences in the quality of service to
result in differences in rates to the same members of an otherwise uniform class. See Re
Blair Tel. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 262, 264 (Neb. P.S.C. 1963) (to provide an
incentive for a small telephone company to replace old wall and desk type instruments
with a new handset type as rapidly as possible, an authorized rate increase would be
permitted to go into effect only as each instrument was replaced).
162. 194 Neb. 55, 230 N.W.2d 190 (1975).
163. Id. at 63, 230 N.W.2d at 196. The court stated:
[I]nherent in the power of the commission is its right to force a utility to give the
service for which its rates have been fixed. As a corollary to that power must be
the right, where the service is woefully inadequate, to require the utility to rebate
some portion of the rates set for reasonably adequate service.
Id.
164. Id. The court reasoned:
[T]he commission, as part of its power and duty to establish rates which will pro-
vide an adequate return and to regulate the services of utilities, must have the
authority to compel the utility to render the service for which it induced the com-
mission to fix an adequate rate.
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The Nebraska decision is not unique. In 1957, the New York com-
mission reduced a New York telephone company's rates to make them
commensurate with the poor quality of service.165 The state of New
York institutionalized such a review, with the commission finding that
rate adjustments could be based on numerical indicators of whether
service quality was poor.166 In 1969, the Florida commission ordered a
telephone company to refund a portion of the money received from
customers through a provisional rate increase once it was found that
the utility had not complied with a prior order of the commission
which related to the quality of the utility's service.167 In 1979, the
Maine Public Utility Commission disallowed a return on equity for a
water company because of the substandard quality of water service.168
Moreover, rate adjustments for inadequate service have not been
limited to entire classes of customers. For example, the Indiana com-
mission found that rate relief could be provided to a portion of residen-
tial customers. In Re Midwest Telephone Co.,169 the commission held
that no telephone utility can render reasonably adequate service with
more than ten subscribers on any line. 170 The commission further held
that particular customers who paid for adequate service but did not
receive it were eligible for rate relief. That relief was available "until
such time that such service is made reasonably adequate."1 71
Courts denying rate refunds, rebates or discounts for inadequate ser-
vice approve of the principle, but preclude relief based upon the facts.
In a Vermont case, for example, the court denied relief because the
consumers alleging inadequate service did not prove the extent of their
loss. 172 In contrast, a North Carolina court held that a utility may not
be penalized twice: once through a reduction in the value of its prop-
165. Re New York Tel. Co., 92 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d 321, 357 (N.Y. P.S.C. 1971).
166. Id. at 358.
167. Re Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., Docket no. 9775-TP, Order No. 4462-A
(Fla. P.U.C. July 22, 1969).
168. Re Northport Mountain Spring Water Co., F.C. Nos. 2437, 2491 (Me. P.U.C.
Dec. 17, 1979).
169. 23 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 26 (Ind. P.S.C. 1958).
170. Id. at 32.
171. Id. at 31. The Commission provided relief to all customers in a designated
local exchange area. Accord Re Western Light & Tel. Co., 10 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d 70, 76
(Mo. P.S.C. 1955).
172. Arlington Selectmen v. Arlington Water Co., 136 Vt. 495, 496, 394 A.2d 1130,
1131 (1978) (undrinkable water held to have substantial value, thus undermining con-
sumer's refund claim).
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erty, and again through an express rate discount or refund. 1
73
When customers are entitled to relief, the scope of that relief is not
subject to exact determination. According to the Kentucky appellate
courts, the extent of the relief, "is primarily one of regulatory policy to
be determined by the Public Service Commission."174 Nevertheless,
courts and regulators have developed a "test" to determine the reason-
ableness of a refund. The Georgia commission concluded that rates
should be reduced to "make them commensurate with the poor quality
of service provided." 175 Further, the Georgia commission held that
the rates of a telephone company should "be reduced so that they are
commensurate with the character and quality of service rendered."'
176
Other commissions do not use a principled calculation to make a rate
adjustment. In Chandler & McKenzie, Inc. v. Osland,177 the Colorado
commission waived the water charges from customers for a three
month period during which a serious water shortage occurred. 178
While specific rebates have been granted to specific customers when
the utility renders inadequate service, 17 these cases involve a broader
principle. The rebates illustrate that charging different rates to differ-
ent customers, even within the same customer class,' 8 is not "discrim-
inatory" if the utility has provided different levels of service-one
adequate and the other not. The level of rates and the level of service
cannot be isolated from each other. If the customer has bought and
paid for a designated service which she has not received, then imposing
identical rates rather than recognizing different rates greatly advances
discrimination.
Accordingly, permitting a downward adjustment in the mistaken un-
dercharge situation allows a utility commission to reconcile a public
173. State ex reL Util. Comm'n v. General Tel. Co., 21 N.C. App. 408, 411, 204
S.E.2d 529, 531 (remanding the case to the commission for specific factual findings
regarding inadequate service) rev'd, 285 N.C. 671, 208 S.E.2d 681 (1974) (holding that
commission's failure to find specific facts was harmless error and remand would only
delay final determination).
174. Lexington v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 249 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Ky. 1952).
175. Re Parker, 19 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 400 (Ga. P.S.C. 1957).
176. Re Segler, 68 Pub. Util. Rep. 2d (PUR) 117 (Ga. P.S.C. 1947).
177. 1933 B Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 357 (Colo. P.S.C. 1932).
178. Id. at 361-62.
179. In re Application No. 30466, 194 Neb. 55, 60, 230 N.W.2d 190, 195 (1975). A
utility "may not continue to exact rates for reasonably adequate service that wholly fails
to meet that standard." Id. 230 N.W.2d at 195.
180. For example, two residential customers.
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utility's duty to charge mandatory rates with its duty to deliver the
services for which it has collected compensation. Particularly with
low-income customers, a strict rule against rebates based upon the pub-
lic policy against discriminatory rates becomes less compelling. Unlike
carrier cases in which states promulgate statutes and tariffs to avoid
collusion between the carrier and the customer,""' a utility retains no
motivation to enter into such favorable contract terms with low-in-
come residential utility customers. The strict rule against preferential
ratemaking in the carrier cases is thus inapplicable to a mistaken un-
dercharge which imposes a severe hardship on a low-income
household.
C. Damages For Inadequate Service
A utility is liable for all damages proximately caused by the rendi-
tion of inadequate service.I 2 Accordingly, if there is a delay in provid-
ing a complete and accurate bill-willful, negligent or otherwise-the
utility has not provided the service which it has been paid to provide
and it can be sued in either tort or contract.
18 3
CONCLUSION
Traditional doctrine holds that a utility has not only the right, but
the obligation, in an undercharge situation to collect the undercharge
from the consumer. This obligation is predicated on the strong public
policy, as expressed in statute, that utility rates are to be mandatory.
181. See People v. Ryerson, 241 Cal. App. 2d 115, 119, 50 Cal. Rptr. 246, 250
(1966) (articulating the state's interest in avoiding collusion between carriers and
shippers).
182. See, eg., Laclede Gas Co. v. Solon Gershman, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1976). See generally Annotation, Liability of Electric, Power or Light Com-
pany For Interruption, Failure or Inadequacy of Power, 4 A.L.R. 3D 594 (1965); Anno-
tation, Measure and Amount of Damages for Breach of Duty to Furnish Water, Gas,
Light or Power Service, 108 A.L.R. 1174 (1937); Annotation, Liability of Gas, Electric,
or Water Company for Delay in Commencing Service, 97 A.L.R. 838 (1935); Annota-
tion, Question of Proximate Cause as Affecting Liability For Damages For Failure to
Obtain Telephone Connection, 10 A.L.R. 1456 (1921), supplemented by 19 A.L.R. 1419
(1922).
183. 64 AM. JUR. 2d Public Utilities §§ 28, 30 (1972). See also 86 C.J.S. Telecom-
munications § 272(a) (1954); Wrongful Termination of Electric Service, 15 PROOF OF
FACTS 2d 125 (1978); 9 AM. JUR. P. and Prac Forms (Rev.), Forms 31, 32 (1984). See
generally Colton, Utility Disconnections as a Tort: Gaining Compensation for the Harms
of Unlawful Utility Shutoffs, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE Rv. 609 (1988).
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To effectuate this statutory policy, utilities have a mandatory duty to
collect the rates included in their filed tariffs.
Nevertheless, the utility is not obligated to rely upon the disconnec-
tion of service as a collection device. As the courts have repeatedly
recognized in constitutional "state action" discussions, the disconnec-
tion of service is entirely discretionary with the utility. Moreover, even
a state's encouragement of the collection of delinquent accounts does
not translate the use of the disconnection of service into a non-
mandatory activity. Therefore, a utility may be estopped from discon-
necting service for nonpayment of an undercharge, even if the utility is
permitted to use any other legitimate collection device.
This result is not simply a public policy decision by the respective
state public utility commission based upon the "equities" of a particu-
lar situation. Black letter utility law prohibits the use of disconnection
of service for a matter that is "collateral" to the provision of that ser-
vice."4 While the law recognizes the right of a utility to collect out-
standing amounts for these collateral matters, the utility is barred from
using the disconnection of service as a collection device."' 5 Moreover,
while the law recognizes the rights of creditors to collect arrearages, it
also abhors forfeitures."8 6 The courts have been particularly aggressive
in preventing practices in the nature of forfeiture when the creditor has
in any way contributed to the default.18 7
In addition to this preservation of utility service against disconnec-
tion, a household may seek damages arising from a utility undercharge.
The customer may not seek the amount of the undercharge as dam-
ages, however, because that would simply allow discrimination by indi-
rection which is prohibited by direction. At the same time, however,
by way of counter-claim, consumers may plead for damages directly
caused by the utility undercharge that they would not have incurred
but for the undercharge.
Notwithstanding traditional doctrine, a need for a new approach to
the mistaken utility undercharge exists. Courts and commissions must
realize that a utility has obligations beyond providing non-discrimina-
tory service. A utility has a further duty, established by statute, con-
tract, and the common law, to provide "reasonably adequate service."
184. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
187. Id.
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The rates charged to consumers assume that such adequate service is
indeed provided. The rendition of reasonably adequate service involves
more than simply the provision of energy, water, or telecommunica-
tions. It also involves the provision of complete, timely, and accurate
bills.
When a utility fails to provide adequate service for which it has
charged, the consumers who have received the inadequate service not
only are entitled to a rebate of some portion of the rates paid for the
higher level of service, but are also entitled to collect damages for the
utility's breach of its duty. A rebate of some portion of rates paid for
lower quality service is not prohibited by non-discrimination statutes.
Discrimination arises when utilities charge a uniform rate, yet provide
different levels of service.
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